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ABSTRACT: I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic 
regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that (1) acquired 
knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and (2) any 
knowledge must be acquired. (1) is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and 
about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is. (1) and (2) jointly imply a 
regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite 
sequence of known reasons. Plato’s response to the problem is to accept (1) but reject (2): 
some knowledge is innate. He argues from this to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. 
This argument can be understood as a response to an Eleatic problem about the possibility 
of coming into being that turns on a regress-generating causal principle analogous to the 
regress-generating principle presupposed by Meno’s paradox. 
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Introduction 
An epistemic regress problem is about the reasons we must have if our cognitive 
states are to have an epistemic value such as being justified or being cases of 
knowledge. A key component of any regress problem is a regress-generating 
principle. A regress-generating principle says that a thing x has a property  only if 
some thing y also has  and stands in a -relevant relationship to x. An epistemic 
regress-generating principle states that a cognitive state can have a target epistemic 
value only if it stands in a reason-providing relationship to some cognitive state that 
also has that value. It is plausible, for example, that we can know a proposition only 
if we know a proposition that is an epistemic reason to believe it. Because this 
principle implies that the reason for a case of knowledge must itself be a case of 
knowledge, the same principle applies to the reason. It follows that any case of 
knowledge must be the first component of an endless sequence of known reasons. 
Any such sequence of reasons must either loop back on itself and form a circle or go 
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on to infinity. Each of these conditions, however, seems to be incompatible with 
having knowledge.1  
I give a rather freewheeling reading of key parts of Plato’s Meno and argue 
that Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem about the possibility of 
knowledge. The paradox is based on a regress-generating principle to the effect that 
in order to have knowledge about something X, a person S must already have some 
knowledge about X—knowledge of what X is—among S’s reasons. But since 
knowledge about what X is would itself be knowledge about X, it follows that we 
can have knowledge about what X is only if we have prior knowledge about what X 
is. This is impossible. Meno thinks the paradox shows that we cannot know 
anything. Plato thinks the solution is to recognize that some knowledge is innate. 
From this result, Plato draws the conclusion that the soul is immortal. I provide a 
speculative explication of these arguments that, if successful, connects them to 
enduring problems in epistemology and metaphysics. 
Inquiry and Human Excellence 
Meno’s paradox (80d–e) is a challenge to the possibility of inquiry. If inquiry is the 
pursuit of knowledge by means of thinking, it is uncontroversial that inquiry is 
possible. Seeking to know what human excellence is, Socrates and Meno are able to 
ask and to answer questions about its nature. They are also able to reason about those 
answers by identifying their implications and by thinking about whether those 
implications are correct. It is clear and therefore uninteresting that inquiry, 
understood in this way, is possible. Because Plato devotes a significant portion of the 
Meno to Socrates’s response to Meno’s paradox, it is likely that he has a more 
interesting problem in mind. What is at stake in Meno’s paradox, I suggest, is not 
whether inquiry is possible but whether successful inquiry is possible. In particular, 
the problem is about whether it is possible to acquire knowledge by means of 
inquiry. This leads to a problem about whether we can have any knowledge at all if, 
with Meno, we assume that the only way to have knowledge is to acquire it by means 
of inquiry. For if knowledge must be acquired by means of inquiry and we cannot 
acquire knowledge by means of inquiry, then we cannot know anything. 
One reason for taking Meno’s paradox to be about the possibility of having 
knowledge is that this gives thematic unity to the dialogue. From the beginning, the 
                                                        
1 For an earlier attempt of mine to unpack the logic of epistemic regress problems see Andrew 
Cling, “The Epistemic Regress Problem,” Philosophical Studies 140 (2008): 401–42. 
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Meno is about the nature of human excellence: that thing, whatever it is, that makes 
human lives worthwhile. Why would Plato suddenly switch the topic of the Meno 
from the nature of human excellence to the possibility of inquiry? The answer, I 
suggest, is that Plato does not change the topic. For Socrates thinks that human 
excellence is wisdom, a kind of knowledge. If we cannot have knowledge, then we 
cannot have human excellence. On this interpretation, Meno’s paradox is a direct 
attack on Socrates’s belief about what would make life worthwhile. Plato’s anti-
skeptical epistemology is a key part of his theory of the meaning of life. 
Socrates indicates several times that he takes human excellence to be wisdom, 
knowledge of goodness. He argues that no one knowingly wants what is bad (77b–
78a) from which it follows that to know the good is to desire it. So, insofar as our 
beliefs and desires give us control over how well our lives go, the key to a meaningful 
life is having knowledge of goodness. Later in the dialogue Socrates argues that since 
human excellence must be a beneficial state of the soul and the only state of the soul 
that is beneficial without qualification is wisdom, human excellence must be wisdom 
(88c–d). He purports to reject this argument for a manifestly bad reason—knowledge 
is teachable but virtue is not teachable because no one teaches it (89d)—but he surely 
recognizes that this objection is terrible. So this argument together with his rejection 
of weakness of will give us reason to think that Socrates accepts the idea that human 
excellence is knowledge of goodness. This explains why Socrates takes Meno’s 
skepticism about knowledge to be a serious moral threat: 
We must, therefore, not believe that debater’s argument, for it would make us idle, 
and fainthearted men like to hear it, whereas my argument makes them energetic 
and keen on the search. (81d)2 
I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend 
at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver 
and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, 
rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know and 
that we must not look for it. (86b) 
Meno’s Paradox 
Meno poses his paradox with three rhetorical questions: 
Meno: But [M1] how will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all 
                                                        
2 All quotations from Plato are from Plato, Plato’s Meno and are cited in the text by their Stephanus 
numbers. 
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what it is? [M2] How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? 
[M3] If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you 
did not know? (80d) 
I take inquiry to be any more-or-less orderly way of thinking with the goal of 
acquiring knowledge about something. Knowledge about an object X would be a 
cognitive state that includes an accurate way of thinking about X and that is held in 
the proper way. (Saying just what it is to be in a cognitive state properly is one of 
the central problems of epistemology.) Because Plato thinks that objects—especially 
unchanging forms or universals—and not just propositions, can be objects of 
knowledge, we need a way to describe cases of knowledge that includes both beliefs 
and non-propositional cognitive states as potential cases of knowledge. To capture 
both kinds of knowledge, I shall take a case of knowledge to be a cognitive state that 
has both an object to which the knower is related and a way of thinking about that 
object, a content. To have propositional knowledge about an object X one must be 
related to X by believing a true proposition about X. To have non-propositional 
knowledge about X one must think about X by means of a content that is not 
propositional. To acquire knowledge is to go from a state in which one does not have 
an item of knowledge to a state in which one does have that knowledge. Meno’s 
paradox is a problem about whether there can be a way of thinking by means of 
which we are able go from a state in which we do not have an item of knowledge to 
a state in which we do have that knowledge. It is also about what follows from this 
for the possibility that we have any knowledge at all. 
Meno’s first question [M1] is about the possibility of coming to know what 
human excellence is. Rhetorical questions are disguised statements and [M1] 
expresses the proposition that in order to acquire knowledge about human 
excellence by means of inquiry a person must first know what human excellence is. 
Question [M2] generalizes this claim by expressing the proposition that in order to 
acquire knowledge about anything by means of inquiry a person must first know 
what it is. These propositions echo Socrates’s earlier claim that in order to know the 
qualities of a thing one must know what it is (71b).3 Each of these claims is about 
                                                        
3 This does not, strictly, imply that knowing what something is must be epistemically prior to 
knowing its qualities, but, given the paradox, I think this is what Plato has in mind. For Meno’s 
paradox is about the conditions we must satisfy before we can acquire knowledge, that is, come to 
have knowledge we do not have to begin with. Put another way, the problem is about the resources 
one must have in the state of not having the target knowledge in order to come to have that 
knowledge, not just what the logical consequences of having knowledge are. 
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priority because the problem is about how to acquire knowledge. The idea here is 
that in order to acquire knowledge about a thing a person must first have a special 
kind of knowledge about it: knowledge of what it is.4 On this interpretation, [M1] 
and [M2] are not obvious. Without a plausible reason to believe them, they do not 
constitute a paradox.  
[M3] is Meno’s reason for [M1] and [M2]. What does it mean? One possibility 
is that it is the claim that no one can acquire any knowledge by means of inquiry. 
This, however, would make Meno’s argument question-begging, not a paradox. A 
better possibility is that [M3] expresses the proposition that to have knowledge a 
person must have knowledge. As it stands, however, this is a much-too-plausible 
trivial truth. No skeptical conclusion follows from that. We need a way to strengthen 
[M2] so that it is a plausible, substantive claim that is a reason for [M1] and [M2]. 
There are two keys to [M3]. The first key is that it is about reasons. This is 
implicit in Meno’s idea that it is possible to ‘meet with’ an object of inquiry and still 
not know it. This is possible, even in otherwise ideal conditions, if a person lacks a 
standard by means of which to identify accurate ways of thinking about the object 
of inquiry. To acquire propositional knowledge about an object X, we need a 
standard by which to to identify true propositions about X. In this case, the standard 
we need is a factor that counts in favor of believing those propositions because it 
implies or indicates that they are true. To acquire non-propositional knowledge 
about X, we need a standard by means of which to identify accurate non-
propositional ways of thinking about X. In this case, the standard we need is a factor 
that counts in favor of thinking about X in the relevant non-propositional ways 
because it indicates that those non-propositional ways of thinking about X are 
accurate. For both propositional and non-propositional knowledge we need a 
standard that counts in favor of thinking about X in a particular way because it 
implies or indicates that the content of that way of thinking about X is accurate. 
Without a standard for identifying accurate ways of thinking about X, we can ‘meet 
with’ a thing or a proposition—either directly or by thinking about it—but fail to 
think about it in a way that amounts to knowing it. A factor that counts in favor of 
thinking about X in a specified way is a reason for thinking about X in that way. 
Meno’s paradox is about the kinds of reasons that we need in order to acquire 
knowledge. 
                                                        
4 Gail Fine, The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox from Socrates to Sextus (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 31–34. 
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The second key to [M3] is that it is about epistemic priority. Meno’s paradox 
is about the conditions that one must satisfy in order to acquire an item of 
knowledge. Since acquiring an item of knowledge is going from a state in which one 
lacks that knowledge to a state in which one has that knowledge, it is about what 
we must know before we have the target knowledge. Although this priority has 
implications for the way in which inquiry must be organized in time, it is essentially 
epistemic, not temporal, priority. 
Epistemic priority is about the relationships between a person’s reasons and 
the cognitive states for which they are reasons. To define the concept of epistemic 
priority, we need a notion of the reason ancestry of a cognitive state. Letting capital 
letters with the form ˹Cn˺ refer to cognitive states by means of their propositional or 
non-propositional contents, we may specify the reason ancestry of a cognitive state 
C1 recursively, as follows: 
(RA1) If C2 is a reason for C1 for S, then C2 is in the reason ancestry of C1 for S. 
(RA2) If C3 is in the reason ancestry of C2 for S and C2 is in the reason ancestry of 
C1 for S, then C3 is in the reason ancestry of C1 for S. 
(RA3) Nothing is in the reason ancestry of C1 for S except in virtue of (RA1) and 
(RA2). 
According to this account, the reason ancestry of a cognitive state includes all of the 
reasons that a person has for being in that state, the reasons for those reasons, and so 
on. 
We can now define epistemic priority in terms of the reason ancestry of a 
cognitive state. A cognitive state Cn is epistemically prior to cognitive state C1 for a 
person S just in case Cn is in the reason ancestry of C1 for S but C1 is not in the reason 
ancestry of Cn for S. The central idea in Meno’s paradox is that a cognitive state with 
a special content—what X is—is epistemically prior to any cognitive state that is a 
case of knowledge about X. So, according to Meno’s paradox, a cognitive state that 
is a case of knowing what X is must be in the reason ancestry of any case of 
knowledge about X but not vice versa. 
The Problem 
We are now in a position to explicate Meno’s paradox. It is this argument for 
skepticism: (1) In order to acquire knowledge about X a person must first know what 
X is, (2) all knowledge is acquired knowledge, and (3) persons cannot acquire 
knowledge about X if that requires an infinte regress of reasons, therefore (4) no one 
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can have any knowledge about any object X. (1) and (2) jointly imply that knowledge 
requires an infinite regress of reasons. Together with (3), this implies that no one 
can have any knowledge. Let me explain. 
I explicate Meno’s argument as follows: 
1) For all persons S, objects X, and cognitive states C1, C1 is a case of acquired 
knowledge about X for S only if there is a C2 such that (i) C2 is a case of 
knowledge about X for S, (ii) C2 is in the reason ancestry of C1 for S, (iii) 
C2 is a case of knowledge about what X is, and (iv) C1 is not in the reason 
ancestry of C2 for S. 
2) For all persons S, objects X, and cognitive states C1, C1 is a case of 
knowlege about X for S only if C1 is a case of acquired knowlege about X 
for S. 
3) For all persons S, objects X, and cognitive states C1, C1 is not a case of 
knowledge about X if that requires that there are infinitely many cases of 
knowledge about what X is in the reason ancestry of C1. 
4)  For all persons S, objects X, and cognitive states C1, C1 is not a case of 
knowlege about X for S. 
(1) and (2) jointly imply this regress-generating principle: 
(RGM) For all persons S, objects X, and cognitive states C1, C1 is a case of knowledge 
about X for S only if there is a C2 such that (i) C2 is a case of knowledge about X for 
S, (ii) C2 is in the reason ancestry of C1 for S, (iii) C2 is a case of knowledge about 
what X is, and (iv) C1 is not in the reason ancestry of C2 for S. 
Clause (i) is a recursion condition essential to generating a regress. Clause (ii) 
expresses the reason-providing relationship that is essential to generating an 
epistemic regress in this case. Clauses (iii) and (iv) are the special conditions on 
knowledge implicit in Meno’s principle [M3]. Clause (iii) is a special condition on 
the reasons that are required for knowledge: knowledge about what X is must be 
among our reasons if we are to have any knowledge about X. Clause (iv) is the 
epistemic priority condition about the relationships between the reasons we have 
for a case of knowledge, on the one hand, and that knowledge on the other. 
(RGM) implies that any case of knowledge must be the first component of an 
infinite regress of reasons that are cases of knowledge. For suppose that a cognitive 
state C1 is a case of knowledge about X for a person S. Given this, (RGM) implies—
by (i), (ii), and (iii)—that there is a cognitive state C2 that is a case of knowledge 
about what X is in the reason ancestry of C1 for S. Since, however, knowing what X 
is is itself a case of knowledge about X, (RGM) implies—by (iii) and (iv)—that there 
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is an epistemically prior case of knowledge about what X is, C3, in the reason ancestry 
of C2 for S, and so on. To see what this implies about the possibility of knowledge, 
we must consider three possibilities: (a) there is only one cognitive state that is a case 
of knowledge about what X is, (b) there are more than one but finitely many 
cognitive states that are cases of knowledge about what X is, and (c) there are 
infinitely many cognitive states that are cases of knowledge about what X is. In cases 
(a) and (b), (RGM) implies skepticism all by itself. (RGM) does not imply skepticism 
in case (c), so the no-infinite-regress principle (NR) is required for the argument to 
imply skepticism. 
Suppose, as Plato seems to, that there is only one cognitive state that is a case 
of knowledge about what X is. This assumption together with (RGM) implies that 
knowledge is impossible. Let C1 be a potential case of knowledge about X and let C2 
be the one cognitive state that is knowledge about what X is. (RGM) implies that C1 
must have C2 in its reason ancestry. Because C2 is itself a case of knowledge about X 
and C2 is the only cognitive state that is a case of knowledge about what X is, (RGM) 
implies that C2 must be in its own reason ancestry. (RGM) also implies, however, 
that this is impossible for it implies—via (iv)—that C2 cannot be in its own reason 
ancestry. So if there is only one way to have knowledge about what X is and (RGM) 
is true, then knowledge is impossible. 
Suppose that there are more than one but only finitely many distinct cognitive 
states that are the cases of knowledge about what X is. This assumption together 
with (RGM) also implies that knowledge is impossible. Let C1 be a potential case of 
knowledge about X and let C2 … Cn be the cognitive states that are cases of 
knowledge about what X is. Under these conditions (RGM) implies that some case 
of knowledge about what X is must be in its own reason ancestry. Since C1 must have 
a case of knowledge about what X is in its reason ancestry and every case of 
knowledge about what X is is itself a case of knowledge about X, (RGM) implies that 
every case of knowledge about what X is requires that there be an epistemically 
prior, hence distinct, case of knowing what X is in its reason ancestry. Sooner or 
later there will be no new cases of knowledge about what X is to add to the reason 
ancestry of C1. So either the final case of knowledge about what X is in the reason 
ancestry of C1—Cn—has no case of knowledge about what X is in its own reason 
ancestry—in which case (RGM) implies that it is not a case of knowledge—or Cn has 
some case of knowledge about what X is in its ancestry. Since, by hypotheses, all of 
the cases of knowledge about what X is have appeared earlier in the reason ancestry 
of C1, this case of knowing what X is must have appeared earlier in the sequence and, 
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therefore, will be in its own reason ancestry. (RGM), however, implies that this is 
incompatible with having knowledge. So if there are more than one but finitely 
many cognitive states that are cases of knowledge about what X is, (RGM) implies 
that knowledge is impossible. 
Suppose, finally, that there are infinitely many distinct cognitive states that 
are cases of knowledge about what X is. This assumption together with (RGM) does 
not imply that knowledge about X is impossible. For suppose that a cognitive state 
C1 is a case of knowledge about X. (RGM) implies that there is a cognitive state C2 
that is a case of knowledge about what X is that is in the reason ancestry of C1. Since 
C2 is itself a case of knowledge about X, (RGM) implies that there is a distinct 
cognitive state C3 that is a case of knowledge about what X is that is in the cognitive 
ancestry of C2, and so on. Since, by hypothesis, there are infinitely many cognitive 
sates that are ways of knowing what X is, we need never run out of cases of 
knowledge about what X is to be in the reason ancestry of C1. So (RGM) does not 
imply that knowledge is impossible if there are infinitely many cognitive states that 
are cases of knowledge about what X is. This is why Meno’s paradox requires the 
injunction against infinite regresses expressed by (3). 
Platonic Rationalism and What X Is 
Plato’s response to Meno’s paradox is to avoid commitment to the regress-generating 
principle (RGM) by rejecting (2). In his view, not all knowledge is acquired by means 
of inquiry, some is innate. Plato, however, accepts (1): in order to acquire knowledge 
about X one must first know what X is. This explains why Socrates restates Meno’s 
paradox: 
Socrates: I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what a debater’s 
argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows 
or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he 
knows it there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does 
not know what to look for. (80e) 
Socrates restates the problem because he agrees with Meno that because (1) is 
true, if all knowledge is acquired, then we cannot have any knowledge. Since any 
acquired knowledge about X requires prior knowledge about what X is and 
knowledge about what X is is knowledge about X, the only way to acquire 
knowledge about X—assuming that there are at most finitely many ways to have 
knowledge about what X is—is to have innate knowledge about what X is. Socrates’s 
interrogation of Meno’s slave boy about the problem of doubling the square (82b–
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86c) is designed to provide independent support for this rationalism. For, as we may 
put it in light of my explication of Meno’s paradox, the knowledge the boy acquires 
as a result of this interrogation requires an epistemically prior, innate standard for 
distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate ways of thinking about squares. 
Socrates can avoid being committed to the implausible view that all 
knowledge is innate on this interpretation. That all knowledge is innate is suggested 
in some places in the dialogue but Socrates does not need it. One place this view is 
suggested is at the end of Socrates’s restatement of the paradox at 80d itself. For one 
way to read the final clause quoted just above is as the claim that unless S already 
has a given item of knowledge C1, S cannot be in a position to recognize that the 
content of C1 itself is accurate. It follows from this that all of the knowledge we have 
must be innate because we can identify accurate ways of thinking only by means of 
themselves. Another way to read the passage, however, is to take it as the claim that 
C1 cannot be a case of acquired knowledge about X that we do not already have 
unless we first know what X is—have a standard for deciding that the content of C1 
is accurate—and we cannot know what X is if all knowledge must be acquired. This 
sort of reading is further supported by Socrates’s later claims that seem to commit 
him to the idea that it is important to seek to acquire knowledge (81d) and that it is 
important to believe that we can “find out what we do not know” (86c). It is also 
supported by this suggestive, dark poetic passage: 
As the whole of nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, nothing 
prevents a man, after recalling one thing only—a process men call learning—
discovering everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search, 
for searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection. (81d) 
This passage suggests that we are in a position to acquire knowledge if we have 
at least some—“one thing only”—knowledge that is innate. Plato seems to hold the 
view that our innate grasp of the unchanging forms provides us with knowledge 
about what X is for each type of thing and that this puts us in a position to acquire 
other knowledge about things of those types. Whether or not this interpretation can 
make sense of every relevant passage, it is evident that because the view that some 
knowledge is innnate is weaker claim than the claim that all knowledge is innate, it 
is a more plausible version of epistemological rationalism. 
I have not given an account of Plato’s view about the content of any 
knowledge about what X is. One might think, for example, that the content of this 
knowledge must be the same as the content of a correct answer to a Socratic 
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interrogation about X.5 On this view, for example, the content of knowledge about 
what human excellence is must be the same thing as the content of a correct answer 
to Socrates’s question to Meno, “what is human excellence?” If that answer must 
imply all of the necessary conditions on human excellence, it will be hard to have 
knowledge about what human excellence is and, therefore, harder still to know 
anything else about it. The same thing goes for any object about which we might 
seek to acquire knowledge: if any knowledge about X requires prior knowledge of 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for being X, it will hard to have any 
knowledge at all, whether or not Meno’s paradox about acquiring knowledge can be 
solved. But Meno does not need this sort of view about the content of what X is for 
his paradox to arise. For, as I have argued, the paradox requires only that knowledge 
about what X is be a standard by which to identify accurate ways of thinking about 
X. Whatever the specific details about the content of knowledge about what X is, it 
is plausible to think that knowledge about anything X requires knowledge of an 
epistemically prior standard for identifying accurate ways of thinking about X. This 
is enough to make Meno’s paradox a serious challenge to the possibility of 
knowledge.  
Meno’s Paradox, an Eleatic Principle, and Immortality 
Plato argues from his claim that we have some innate knowledge to the conclusion 
that the soul is immortal. In this section, I offer an interpretation of that argument 
in light of my interpretation of Meno’s paradox and a related principle that seems to 
be implicit in some Eleatic arguments about the possibility of coming into being. 
Meno’s paradox is a special case of an Eleatic problem about coming to be.6 In 
particular, it is a problem about how properties can come into being. According to a 
causal principle that seems to be presupposed in much ancient thinking, a thing can 
have a property  only if something else has  and causes  to be in the target 
object.7 For a property to come into being, there must be a prior time at which it 
                                                        
5 See Fine, The Possibility of Inquiry, 31–45. 
6 Taking Meno’s paradox to be analogous to an Eleatic problem was suggested to me by Michael 
McShane (unpublished lecture). In McShane’s view, Meno’s three questions are directly analogous 
to one of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion: [1] motion cannot begin, [2] motion cannot continue, [3] 
motion cannot come to an end. In my view, by contrast, the problem is about what is required for 
a property to come into being. 
7 For a discussion of the role of this principle in the Presocratics and Plato, see Henry Teloh, The 
Development of Plato’s Metaphysics (State College, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
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does not exist. Given this and the causal principle it follows that a property  can 
come into being only if there is a time at which  does not already exist and does 
already exist, an impossibility. Letting ‘x’ and ‘y’ range over objects and ‘’ over 
properties, we may state the relevant causal principle this way: 
(CP) For all x and , x has  only if there is a y such that (i) y has , (ii) y causes 
 to be in x, and (iii) x is not in the causal ancestry of y. 
It is evident that (CP) is a regress-generating principle similar to (RGM). Like 
(RGM), (CP) contains an ancestry condition. In (CP) the ancestry condition is that 
no object that has a property can be in its own causal ancestry. This condition 
guarantees that (CP) can be satisfied only if there is a distinct object having  in the 
causal ancestry of any object that has . It also explains the argument for the 
conclusion that no property can come into being. The claim that a property comes 
into being implies that there is a prior time at which it does not exist. (CP), however, 
implies that there is no prior time at which a property does not exist. Meno’s paradox 
applies an analogous principle to knowledge. Since all knowledge requires some 
prior knowledge, it is not possible for the property of being a case of knowledge to 
come into being. 
This provides us with the conceptual materials we need to make sense of a 
provocative Platonic argument from the existence of innate knowledge to the 
immortality of the soul: 
Socrates: If then, during the time he exists and is not a human being he will have 
true opinions which, when stirred by questioning, become knowledge, will not his 
soul have learned during all time? For it is clear that during all time he exists, either 
as a man or not. —So it seems. 
Socrates: Then if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul would be 
immortal so that you should always confidently try to seek out and recollect what 
you do not know at present—that is, what you do not recollect. (86a–b) 
Taken literally, the first part of this passage is inconsistent with the view that 
all knowledge is innate. For since innate knowledge is knowledge that is not 
learned—acquired by means of inquiry—it is not possible to learn innate knowledge 
in this life or in a previous life. What might happen, however, is that we are able to 
learn both in this life and in previous lives, if we have some innate knowledge by 
which to identify accurate ways of thinking about things. 
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The argument for immortality is given in Socrates’s second speech above 
(86b): we have some innate knowledge therefore the soul is immortal. This argument 
makes sense given my interpretation of Meno’s paradox and the the causal principle 
(CP). Plato thinks that Meno’s paradox shows that because we have knowledge, not 
all knowledge is acquired, that is, some knowledge does not come into being. Since 
knowledge is a cognitive state—a state of the soul, as Plato would have it—it follows 
that the soul does not come into being and, therefore, is immortal. I suggest that we 
explicate this argument more fully as follows: 
(E1) We have innate knowledge. [Established by Meno’s paradox (80d–e) 
and the interrogation of Meno’s slave (82b–86c).] 
(E2) Knowledge is a state of the soul. [Presupposed at 88c.] 
(E3) Innate knowledge cannot come into being by means of inquiry. 
[Follows from the nature of inquiry.] 
(E4) The only way in which any kind of knowledge can come into being is 
by means of inquiry. [Assumption.] 
(E5)  The soul cannot come into being. [from (E1)–(E4).] 
(E6) What cannot come into being cannot go out of being. [Assumption.] 
(E7)  The soul is immortal (=the soul cannot come into or go out of being). 
[from (E5) and (E6).] 
Although I am not prepared to defend this argument—my suspicion is that 
even the friends of innate knowledge will have doubts about (E4)—any mistakes it 
makes can be uncovered only by means of careful philosophical thinking about 
important questions in metaphysics and epistemology that are still with us. 
Conclusion 
Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. Its key premise is a principle to the 
effect that we can acquire knowledge by means of inquiry only if we have an 
epistemically prior reason by means of which to distinguish accurate from inaccurate 
ways of thinking about the object of knowledge. Together with the assumption that 
all knowledge must be acquired, this implies the regress-generating principle 
according to which all knowledge about any object X requires epistemically prior 
knowledge about what X is. The paradox is a special case of a general problem about 
coming into being. Because of this, Plato is able to use his belief in the reality of 
innate knowledge as a reason for thinking that the soul is immortal. The 
Andrew Cling 
120 
epistemological and metaphysical problems raised by these arguments remain 
serious and are not mere matters of antiquarian curiosity.8 
                                                        
8 I am very grateful to the other participants at the Vanderbilt Workshop on Ancient Epistemology 
who graciously endured a rough, early version of this paper. Their critical questions have greatly 
improved the result. 
